dave b
2010-10-17 02:52:39 UTC
Am I the only person who finds it ironic that the same measures
leveraged against closed source projects have to be employed against
some open source projects?
Yet another example, complete with a public pissing contest: "XSS inleveraged against closed source projects have to be employed against
some open source projects?
Squirrelmail plugin 'Virtual Keyboard'",
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Oct/45
bank, administrative password to systems.... etc. [0]
If you get pwned by lame, you still are pwned.
This is an alarming trend in open source software, and
diametrically opposed to the claims of "more eyes equates
to more secure"", "open source software is more secure",
and "open source software fixes bugs faster than other
software models".
diametrically opposed to the claims of "more eyes equates
to more secure"", "open source software is more secure",
and "open source software fixes bugs faster than other
software models".
What makes open source projects successful is the people usually want
to contribute and are *involved*. "Real quality means making sure that
people are proud of the code they write, that they're involved and
taking it personally. " Linus.
We are all human so ... get over this open source is $better/$worse
than proprietary code. We can submit patches to open source projects,
they might not be accepted. With proprietary software you can't see
how crap component X really is (codewise) but usually it will show up
in use.
The real problem is a lack of awareness in the value of testing code.
Test things that should *fail*, that should *pass* and that shouldn't *work*.
Also, remember you are not testing code for the sake of validation,
but so you know the behaviour of your system matches what you expect.
"I do not see any harm in storing credentials as long as the
rest of your system is properly secure as it should be."
Source:(http://forum.filezilla-project.org/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=17932)
[SNIP]
rest of your system is properly secure as it should be."
Source:(http://forum.filezilla-project.org/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=17932)
[SNIP]
You can 'encrypt them' but to get access they have to be decrypted.
How good should the protection be...
imho desktop keychains are better than in-app level storage.
In most cases no amount of 'protection' will protect a system which
has been owned by an attacker.
[0] https://blogs.apache.org/infra/entry/apache_org_04_09_2010
--
I do desire we may be better strangers. -- William
Shakespeare, "As You Like It"
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